The Influence of Past Negotiations on Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
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Published online: 9 August 2008
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Abstract Choosing the right counterpart can have a significant impact on negoti-
ation success. Unfortunately, little research has studied such negotiation counterpart
decisions. Three studies examined the influence of past negotiations on preferences to
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Group Decis Negot (2010) 19:457–477
DOI 10.1007/s10726-008-9130-1
The Influence of Past Negotiations on Negotiation
Counterpart Preferences
Jochen Reb
Published online: 9 August 2008
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Abstract Choosing the right counterpart can have a significant impact on negoti-
ation success. Unfortunately, little research has studied such negotiation counterpart
decisions. Three studies examined the influence of past negotiations on preferences to
negotiate again with a counterpart. Study 1 found that the more favorable a past nego-
tiated agreement the stronger the preference to negotiate with the counterpart in the
future. Moreover, this relation was mediated through liking of the counterpart. Study
2 manipulated the difficulty of achieving a favorable agreement in the negotiation and
found a significant effect of this situational factor such that subsequent counterpart
preferences were less favorable when the negotiation was difficult. Similar to Study 1,
this effect was mediated through liking of the counterpart. Study 3 examined the pos-
sibility of debiasing negotiator preferences from the biasing influence of situational
characteristics by providing relevant information about the negotiation situation. Rep-
licating the results of Study 2, negotiation difficulty affected counterpart preferences
before additional information was given or when irrelevant information was given.
However, once negotiators received relevant information on the negotiation situation,
the effect of negotiation difficulty disappeared. Theoretical and practical implications
are discussed.
Keywords Interpersonal liking · Negotiation · Negotiation bias · Negotiation
counterpart decision · Negotiation counterpart preference · Negotiation preparation
J. Reb (
B
)
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Road,
Singapore 178899, Singapore
e-mail: jochenreb@smu.edu.sg
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J. Reb
1 Introduction
People frequently negotiate, both at work—with superiors, peers, subordinates, and
customers—and in their private lives—with spouses, children, and friends. As such,
being good at negotiating can provide a variety of benefits. Not surprisingly, research-
ers and practitioners alike have been trying to uncover the factors that lead to success-
ful negotiations. In addition to the behaviors at the “bargaining table”, authors have
emphasized the paramount importance of negotiation preparation for achieving one’s
negotiation goals (Lewicki etal. 2003; Raiffa 2002, 1982; Thompson 2001).
Negotiation preparation consists in the variety of activities undertaken before the
negotiators actually sit down at the bargaining table, such as clarifying one’s goals,
setting one’s aspirations as well as reservation price, getting information about poten-
tial negotiation counterparts, and laying out one’s negotiation strategy (Lewicki etal.
2003). Negotiation preparation also includes searching for potential negotiation coun-
terparts and then deciding with whom to negotiate (Reb 2007; Raiffa 2002, p.200).
Unfortunately,relativelylittleresearchhasaddressedhownegotiatorsmakesuchnego-
tiation counterpart decisions (for exceptions see Barry and Oliver 1996; Tenbrunsel
etal. 1999). To help address this gap in the literature, the present article examines the
influence of past negotiations on individuals’ preferences to negotiate with a counter-
part again in the future.
In the following, I will first elaborate more fully on the concept of negotiation
counterpart decisions. Next, Study 1 tests the hypotheses that economic gain from
past negotiated agreements leads to stronger preferences to negotiate with a counter-
part again in the future, and that this relationship is mediated through liking. Study 2
then examines whether counterpart preferences are more favorable following a nego-
tiation that was easy (because of a wide bargaining zone) rather than difficult (because
of a narrow bargaining zone). Finally, Study 3 attempts to debias negotiators’ coun-
terpart preferences by providing information about the difficulty of the negotiation
situation.
1.1 Negotiation Counterpart Decisions
In many situations, such as which applicant to hire, with which company to form a
joint venture, from whom to purchase supplies for production, or from whom to buy
a car, more than one counterpart is potentially available for negotiations. For reasons
such as lack of time and resources, it is typically not possible to negotiate with all
potential counterparts; a decision needs to be made with whom, and with whom not,
to negotiate. Even when the pool of potential counterparts is small enough so that it
would be possible to negotiate with all of them, at the least, a negotiator needs to decide
on an order in which to negotiate with the available counterparts. And, at the most
basic level, the negotiation counterpart decision is about either selecting or rejecting
a specific counterpart.
Selecting the right counterparts and rejecting the wrong ones can have a signif-
icant impact on negotiation success (Reb 2007; Tenbrunsel etal. 1999). For exam-
ple, the probability of achieving one’s negotiation goals often differs considerably
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Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences
459
across potential counterparts. Counterparts differ in the resources they have to offer,
in their negotiation styles and in many other respects. Negotiators can benefit by choos-
ing counterparts that are compatible in terms of values, resources, style, etc. (Raiffa
2002). Further, negotiating is a costly activity drawing on limited resources such as
time, attention, and money. While negotiating with the wrong counterpart need not
lead to a suboptimal agreement as the negotiation can be broken off without reach-
ing agreement, scarce resources are still being used up during the process. Moreover,
negotiating with the wrong counterpart can be emotionally frustrating because of a
lack of fit between the negotiators. Thus, it is important that we understand better how
negotiators form preferences about potential counterparts.
1.2 Past Outcomes and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
One might expect that negotiators choose among potential counterparts using an
explicit and forward-looking analysis of the expected utility of negotiating with that
party in order to achieve the best possible negotiation outcome. Such a rational pro-
cess would require negotiators to collect and analyze all available information about
potential counterparts and then use this information to calculate the expected utility
of negotiating with these counterparts. However, research has shown that individuals
tend to follow cognitively much less demanding decision processes based on heuris-
tics (e.g., Gilovich etal. 2002; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Kahneman etal. 1982),
conditioning, and learning from past experience (e.g., Erev and Barron 2005; Erev and
Roth 1998; Estes 1964).
Consistent with this view of individuals as, at best, boundedly rational (March and
Simon 1958; Neale and Bazerman 1991), Tenbrunsel etal. (1999) provided evidence
that negotiators use a kind of “relationship heuristic” (p.278) when selecting from a
pool of potential counterparts. In their studies, negotiators were given the opportunity
to first interact with several counterparts and then reach an agreement with only one
of them. Results suggest that negotiators were more likely to enter into agreements
with parties they knew relatively well (“strong ties”). Interestingly, these agreements
were on average worse than agreements between negotiators not connected through
prior relationships, suggesting that the use of this heuristic process reduces negotiation
success.
These findings are interesting because they suggest that the mere presence of past
experiences with another party can affect negotiation counterpart preferences. How-
ever, I expect that, in addition to the presence or absence of a relationship, the quality
of any past interaction also matters for counterpart preferences. Moreover, the qual-
ity of past interaction might be especially important when the past experience was
actually a negotiation (rather than a different type of interaction, say a small-talk at a
dinner party). Past negotiation experiences can provide a source of learning about the
other party and serve as easily available cues to quickly judge the value of a potential
counterpart for future negotiations. Specifically, negotiators might use some form of
a “win-stay, lose-change” heuristic (Kelley etal. 1962; Thorndike 1911): if the past
negotiation was successful, negotiate again with the counterpart; if the past negotia-
tion was unsuccessful, search for a new counterpart. Such a heuristic would predict a
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positive relation between past negotiation quality and preference to negotiate with the
counterpart again.
1
While negotiation quality can be assessed in a variety of ways, the economic gain
a negotiator derives from an agreement is likely to be one of the most salient indica-
tors of negotiation quality. After all, reaching a favorable economic outcome is often
the reason to enter into a negotiation in the first place. Because salient cues tend to
have a strong effect on judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), Study 1 focuses
on the relation between the economic gain derived from a past negotiated agreement
and subsequent negotiation counterpart preferences. I expect that the more favorable
a past negotiated outcome, the higher the preference to negotiate again with the other
party in a subsequent negotiation.
Hypothesis 1 Economic gain from a past negotiated agreement is positively related
to preference to negotiate again with the counterpart in a future negotiation.
1.3 The Role of Interpersonal Liking in Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
Hypothesis 1 is rather intuitive. One interesting question concerns the process through
which past outcomes influence counterpart preferences. I propose that the influence
of past outcomes on subsequent counterpart preferences works to a significant extent
through liking of the other party. Indeed, research has shown a profound influence
of liking on preferences (Zajonc 1980). In the negotiation context, liking has been
found to lead to more positive perceptions of the counterpart (Druckman and Broome
1991). Liking can serve as a simple heuristic through which negotiators arrive at judg-
ments and preferences (Neale and Bazerman 1991). Thus, negotiators might rely to a
substantial degree on their “gut feelings” to make decisions about negotiation coun-
terparts (although that the relative influence of conscious strategy and gut feelings
on such decisions may differ and depend on a variety of factors such as the affective
state of the negotiator, cf. Barry and Oliver 1996). How much one likes another party
provides an easily available cue to evaluate that party. Thus, despite the strategic,
mixed-motive nature of the negotiation situation, I predict that interpersonal liking
significantly influences negotiation counterpart preferences.
Hypothesis 2 Liking of a counterpart is positively related to preference to negotiate
again with the counterpart in a future negotiation.
This prediction is entirely consistent with the argument concerning the influence
of past outcomes on subsequent counterpart preferences. Specifically, liking can be
caused by feeling rewarded from another person (Byrne 1971; Lott and Lott 1974).
Therefore, a favorable negotiation outcome may lead a negotiator to like the counter-
partmore.Thisincreasedlikingthenleadstoastrongerpreferencetonegotiatewiththe
other party again. In other words, the relation between the favorability of a negotiated
agreement and subsequent counterpart preference may be mediated through liking.
1
A similar argument could be made for the quality of the negotiation process: if the past process was good
(e.g., procedurally and interactionally fair), negotiate with the counterpart again; if it was bad, search for
a new counterpart. Indeed, research on organizational justice has highlighted the important role of process
in people’s evaluations (e.g., Lind and Tyler 1988). I will take up this issue again in Sect.5.
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Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences
461
Hypothesis 3 Liking mediates the relation between economic gain from a past nego-
tiated agreement and preference to negotiate again with the counterpart.
Study 1 was designed to test Hypotheses 1 to 3.
2 Study 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants
Participants performed a simulated recruitment negotiation between a job candidate
and a recruiter. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and roles (candidate
or recruiter) and were given 45min to complete the negotiation exercise. They were
encouraged to take the exercise seriously. Upon completion of the simulation the
negotiators together filled out an agreement form on which they calculated the num-
ber of points the agreement was worth to them. Then, they completed by themselves
a post-negotiation questionnaire measuring negotiation counterpart preferences and
interpersonal liking.
Seventy-six undergraduate students at a Southeast Asian university participated in
this simulation as part of a course assignment.
2.1.2 Materials and Measures
2.1.2.1 Negotiation The exercise was an integrative negotiation between a job candi-
date and a recruiter that involved eight issues, including two distributive issues (salary,
starting date), four integrative issues (bonus, vacation time, moving expense cover-
age, insurance coverage) and two common value issues (job assignment, location).
Together with the negotiation and role instructions, negotiators received a payoff table
that allowed them to calculate the number of points (i.e., the economic gain) derived
from any possible agreement. They were instructed to try to maximize the number of
points they received from the agreement. At the end of the negotiation, they calculated
their score, which was used as independent variable.
2.1.2.2 Negotiation Counterpart Preference Two items measured negotiators’ pref-
erences for the other party as a counterpart in future negotiations: “I would like to
negotiate again with my counterpart in a negotiation exercise like this one”, and “I
would like to negotiate again with my counterpart in a negotiation like this but for
real outcomes.” Both measures were assessed with a 7-point Likert scale (7: strongly
agree, 1: strongly disagree). Because the reliability of this scale was relatively low
(r = 0.49,α = 0.66), I also performed all analyses with the single items. All results
were replicated with each item. Thus, for brevity, I report below analyses on a coun-
terpart preference index that averages the two variables.
2.1.2.3 Interpersonal Liking Negotiators’ interpersonal liking of the counterpart was
measured with the following item on a 7-point Likert scale (7: strongly agree, 1:
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Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations (Study 1)
M
SD
1
2
3
1. Economic gain
5231
2110
–
2. Interpersonal liking
5.51
0.96
0.26
∗
–
3. Negotiation counterpart preference
5.35
1.15
0.32
∗∗
0.51
∗∗∗
(0.66)
∗
p < 0.05;
∗∗
p < 0.01;
∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Notes. Interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart preference were assessed on a 7-point Likert-scale
(1–7)
strongly disagree): “Based on my experience in this negotiation I like my negotiation
counterpart.”
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Economic Gain and Subsequent Counterpart Preferences
As expected, the economic gain derived from a negotiated agreement significantly
predicted subsequent counterpart preferences, r = 0.32 (see Table1 for all means,
standard deviations, and correlations). The more favorable the agreement reached, the
stronger was the preference to negotiate with the counterpart again in the future. These
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
2.2.2 The Role of Interpersonal Liking
I next examined the role of interpersonal liking in determining counterpart preferences
in general, and as a mediator of the relation between past outcome and subsequent
counterpart preference in particular. First, liking predicted counterpart preferences,
r = 0.51. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the more negotiators liked their counter-
parts based on the past negotiation experience, the more did they want to negotiate
with them again in the future. To test for mediation (Hypothesis 3), I followed the
widely-usedproceduredescribedinBaronandKenny(1986).First,economicgainpre-
dicted the hypothesized mediator, liking, r = 0.26. The more favorable the negotiated
agreement, the more negotiators liked their counterpart. Second, as reported above,
both the independent variable, economic gain from the negotiated agreement, and the
presumed mediator, liking, predicted the dependent variable, negotiation counterpart
preference. Next, when predicting negotiation counterpart preferences simultaneously
from past economic gain and interpersonal liking, liking continued to be a significant
predictor, β = 0.46, t(73) = 4.51, p < 0.001, but past gain became insignificant,
β = 0.20, t(73) = 1.92, ns. Finally, a Sobel (1982) test for mediation showed that
the indirect, or mediational, path from economic gain through liking to counterpart
preference was significant (z = 2.06, p < 0.05). Thus, consistent with Hypothesis
3, liking mediated the relation between the gain derived from a past agreement, and
preference to negotiate with a counterpart again in the future.
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Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences
463
2.3 Discussion
Study1providedevidencefortheinfluenceofpastnegotiationoutcomesonsubsequent
negotiation counterpart preferences. The higher the gain derived from a negotiated
agreement, the stronger an individual’s preference to negotiate again with the other
party in the future. Interpersonal attraction also predicted counterpart preferences such
that the more negotiators liked the other party, the stronger the counterpart preference.
Further, liking significantly mediated the relation between past outcomes and coun-
terpart preferences. While entirely correlational in nature, these results are consistent
with the idea that the quality of past interactions influences counterpart preferences
through the influence of a gut feeling of liking the counterpart.
As is true for all heuristics, choosing based on the favorability of past agreements
can lead to systematic biases (Gilovich etal. 2002). Consider the potential problems
of a “win-stay, lose-change” strategy, in which a negotiator decides to negotiate again
with a counterpart if the past negotiation turned out well, but rejects the counterpart if
the past outcome was unfavorable. First, there may be important differences between
the past negotiation situation and a future negotiation situation. Because of these dif-
ferences, a counterpart who provided a favorable outcome in the past may not be the
best match for a future negotiation. Second, the gain derived from a past negotiated
agreement provides at best an imperfect cue to judge the value of a counterpart. Spe-
cifically, the reason for the favorable outcome achieved in a past negotiation may
not have lied as much in the characteristics of the counterpart as in the negotiation
situation. For example, a good outcome could have been achieved because of a wide
bargaining zone, i.e., a large pie to distribute between the negotiators. A negotiation
with the same counterpart with a narrower bargaining zone would likely have resulted
in a much less favorable outcome, while at the same time being more contentious and
unpleasant.
Ipredictthatnegotiators’counterpartpreferenceswillfailtotakesituationalfactors,
such as the difficulty of a negotiation, adequately into account. Negotiators’ counter-
part preferences may be negatively affected by an unfavorable outcome even when
this outcome is due to the situational constraint of a narrow bargaining zone, rather
than the other party. This prediction is consistent with research on the fundamental
attribution error (Ross 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980), or the tendency to interpret the
behavior of other people in terms of personality characteristics rather than charac-
teristics of the situation. More recently, Morris etal. (1999) provided evidence for
this tendency among negotiators by showing that negotiators made personality-trait
attributions for behaviors caused by a situational factor. Specifically, they found that
negotiators ascribed more negative personality characteristics, such as lower agree-
ableness, when the negotiation situation was difficult than when it was easy.
Building on this work, I predict that counterpart preferences will be influenced by
(irrelevant) situational factors. Specifically, I expect that negotiators who performed
a difficult negotiation (i.e., a negotiation in which it is difficult to achieve a favorable
outcome because of a narrow bargaining zone) will have less favorable subsequent
counterpart preferences than negotiators who interacted under more favorable condi-
tions (i.e., a negotiation with a wide bargaining zone). Stated differently, I expect the
influence of gain derived from a negotiated agreement to hold even when the gain is
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unrelated to the quality of the counterpart but is determined by the difficulty of the
negotiation situation. Similar to Study 1, I expect this effect of negotiation difficulty
on counterpart preferences to be mediated through liking of the other party: a difficult
negotiation situation reduces interpersonal attraction towards the counterpart, which
then leads to reduced counterpart preference.
Hypothesis 4 Negotiation difficulty affects negotiation counterpart preference such
that the more difficult a past negotiation the less favorable the preference to negotiate
with the counterpart again in a future negotiation.
Hypothesis 5 Liking mediates the effect of negotiation difficulty on preference to
negotiate with the counterpart again in a future negotiation.
3 Study 2
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants
In this laboratory experiment, participants performed a distributive, zero-sum negoti-
ation simulation over a coffee supply contract. The negotiators’ goal was to maximize
their bonuses and this could be done by claiming as much as possible of the bargaining
zone. For the seller, this meant maximizing the sale price of the coffee, and for the
buyer it meant minimizing the price. The study manipulated one factor, negotiation
difficulty, between-dyads across two levels (easy vs. difficult) by varying the width
of the bargaining zone. About half the dyads had a relatively wide bargaining zone,
which made it easy for the negotiators to receive a large bonus, whereas the other half
had a relatively narrow bargaining zone, which made it difficult to reach an agreement
that was better than the parties’ reservation prices, let alone receive a large bonus. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to dyads, roles (buyer or seller), and experimental
condition (difficult or easy negotiation) and were given 30min to complete the negoti-
ation exercise. They were encouraged to take the exercise seriously. Upon completion
of the exercise the negotiators together filled out an agreement form on which they
calculated the bonus they had achieved. Then, they completed by themselves a post-
negotiation questionnaire measuring interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart
preferences.
Thirty-six undergraduate students at a US university participated for course credit.
3.1.2 Materials, Manipulation, and Measures
3.1.2.1 Negotiation The exercise was a negotiation between a salesperson for a cof-
fee distributor and a hotel purchasing agent. Negotiators were given information about
theirreservationpricesaswellasthebonustheywouldgetfromtheircompanydepend-
ing on the agreement reached. In the easy negotiation condition, buyers were told they
would receive $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was below $3.75 per pound (their
reservation price) and sellers were told they would receive $50 bonus for each cent
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Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences
465
the settlement was above $3.15 per pound (their reservation price). This bonus was
only hypothetical. The bargaining zone was $.60 and the total bonus to be distributed
between the two negotiators was $3000. In the difficult negotiation condition con-
dition, buyers received $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was below $3.75 per
pound, and sellers received $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was above $3.65.
The bargaining zone was only $.10 and the total bonus to be distributed was $500. This
manipulation ensured that the favorability of agreement, as measured by the bonus
earned, was considerably higher in the easy negotiation condition.
3.1.2.2 Negotiation Counterpart Preference The same two items as in Study 1 were
used to measure negotiators’ preferences to negotiate again with the other party in
future negotiations. The two measures were again combined into an index by averag-
ing, r = 0.69,α = 0.81.
3.1.2.3 Interpersonal Liking Using the same seven-point scale as in Study 1, a sec-
ond item was added to measure negotiators’ interpersonal liking of the counterpart
to ensure greater reliability. The first item was as in Study 1. The second item read:
“I specifically enjoyed negotiating with this counterpart.” The items were averaged,
r = 0.82,α = 0.90.
3.2 Results
I first examined whether scores at the individual level were dependent on which dyad
negotiators were randomly assigned to, following the procedure described in Kashy
and Kenny (2000). The analyses revealed no influence of dyad on any dependent vari-
ables (all p > 0.9). Based on these results, I analyzed the data at the individual level.
3.2.1 Manipulation Check
To test whether the experimental manipulation of negotiation difficulty was successful,
I examined how exhausting the negotiation was (on a 7-point Likert scale as described
above). As expected, the negotiation was experienced as significantly more exhausting
in the difficult negotiation condition (M = 3.30) than in the easy negotiation condition
(M = 2.19), F(1, 34) = 5.61, p < 0.05.
3.2.2 Negotiation Difficulty and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
To test for the predicted effect of negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences I
conducted an ANCOVA with negotiation difficulty as between-subjects factor and role
as covariate. Results showed that preference to negotiate with the counterpart in the
future was significantly less favorable when the past negotiation situation had been
difficult (M = 4.95, SD = 1.56) than when it had been easy (M = 5.94, SD =
.89), F(1, 33) = 4.92, p < 0.05. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4. The
covariate was not significant, F = .14, ns.
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Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations (Study 2)
M
SD
1
2
3
1. Negotiation difficulty
1.56
0.50
–
2. Interpersonal liking
5.57
1.17
0.36
∗
(0.92)
3. Negotiation counterpart preference
5.39
1.38
0.36
∗
0.83
∗∗∗
(0.81)
∗
p < 0.05;
∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Notes. Interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart preference were assessed on a 7-point Likert-scale
(1–7)
3.2.3 The Role of Interpersonal Liking
Inextexaminedtheroleofinterpersonallikingasamediatoroftheeffectofnegotiation
difficulty on negotiation counterpart preferences (cf. Baron and Kenny 1986). First,
replicating the results of Study 1 and consistent with Hypothesis 2, liking predicted
counterpart preferences,r = 0.83 (see Table2 for means, standard deviations, and cor-
relations). The more negotiators liked their counterparts based on the past negotiation
experience, the more did they want to negotiate with them again. Second, negotia-
tion difficulty affected liking, r = 0.36. Negotiators liked their counterparts more in
the easy negotiation condition than in the difficult negotiation condition. Third, when
predicting negotiation counterpart preferences simultaneously from negotiation diffi-
culty and liking, the latter continued to be a significant predictor, β = 0.81, t(34) =
7.88, p < 0.001, but the former became insignificant, β = 0.07, t(34) = 0.69, ns. A
Sobel (1982) test showed that the indirect, or mediational, path from negotiation dif-
ficulty through liking to counterpart preference was significant (z = 2.23, p < 0.05).
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 5, liking mediated the effect of negotiation difficulty
on negotiation counterpart preferences.
3.3 Discussion
Study 2 examined the effect of a situational factor, the difficulty of the negotiation sit-
uation (i.e., the difficulty to achieve a good outcome because of size of the bargaining
zone), on subsequent negotiation counterpart preferences. As predicted, individuals’
preference to negotiate with the other party again in the future was lower when the past
negotiation situation was difficult (i.e., the bargaining zone was narrow) than when the
situation was easy (i.e., the bargaining zone was wide). In addition, a difficult negoti-
ation situation led negotiators to like their counterparts less. This reduced liking was
associatedwithlowercounterpartpreferences.Importantly,statisticalanalysessuggest
that liking mediated the effect of negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences.
These findings are consistent with research on individuals’ tendency to make per-
sonal attributions towards others even for events and outcomes that are, in fact, due to
characteristics of the situation (Ross 1977). In the present context, the negative impact
of this situational effect is possibly amplified as it works both ways: both negotiators
are likely to attribute a dissatisfying outcome that resulted from a difficult negotiation
situation to the other party. The results suggest that such interpretations of past events
can place a significant burden on the relation between the two negotiators and create
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Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences
467
a formidable obstacle for future interactions that very well could have been beneficial
for both parties (cf. Morris etal. 1999).
The potential negative consequences of the erroneous attribution of a difficult nego-
tiation situation to the counterpart naturally raise the important question of how resis-
tant this effect is against efforts at debiasing. The effect of negotiation difficulty on
counterpart preferences might have been due to a significant degree to negotiators’
lack of awareness about the nature of the negotiation situation they faced. Thus, Study
3 examined whether it is possible to weaken, or even eradicate completely, the influ-
ence of past negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences. The study provided
negotiators with either relevant or irrelevant information about the negotiation situa-
tion after the negotiation. To test the effect of this information, negotiation counterpart
preferences were assessed twice: one time after the negotiation but before the addi-
tional information was given and a second time after the information was provided.
The theoretical argument suggests a three-way interaction between the difficulty of
the negotiation, the relevance of the information, and the measurement (i.e., before or
after the information was received). Specifically, one would expect a significant effect
of negotiation difficulty on negotiation counterpart preferences before the information
was given at the first measurement (consistent with Hypothesis 4 and replicating the
results of Study 2) and also after the irrelevant information was given at the second
measurement. However, this effect of negotiation difficulty should weaken or even
entirely disappear after negotiators received additional relevant information. This pre-
diction is captured in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 Negotiation difficulty, information, and measurement interact to affect
negotiation counterpart preference. Specifically, the effect of negotiation difficulty on
counterpart preference is reduced only after additional relevant information about the
negotiation situation is received.
4 Study 3
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants
Study 3 was designed to test Hypothesis 6. Participants first performed the same dis-
tributive, zero-sum negotiation simulation over a coffee supply contract for a hotel as
in Study 2. The study manipulated three factors: negotiation difficulty, information,
and measurement. Negotiation difficulty was manipulated between-dyads across two
levels (easy vs. difficult) by varying the width of the bargaining zone as in Study
2. Information was also manipulated between-dyads across two levels by either pro-
viding relevant information about the difficulty of the negotiation situation (e.g., the
width of the bargaining zone) or irrelevant information not speaking to the difficulty of
the negotiation situation. Further, in a within-subjects manipulation of measurement,
negotiation counterpart preferences were measured twice after the negotiation: first,
directly after the negotiation; second, after negotiators read the additional (relevant or
irrelevant) information.
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Participants were given 30min to complete the negotiation exercise. Participants
were encouraged to take the task seriously. Upon completion of the first simulation the
negotiators together filled out an agreement form on which they calculated the bonus
they had achieved. Then, they completed by themselves a post-negotiation question-
naire measuring negotiation counterpart preference and interpersonal liking. After
that, they were given a sheet with additional information about the negotiation and
were asked to fill out another post-negotiation questionnaire measuring negotiation
counterpart preference for the second time.
Hundred-forty-eight undergraduate business students participated in exchange for
course credit.
4.1.2 Materials, Manipulations, and Measures
The negotiation simulation and manipulation of negotiation difficulty were the same
as in Study 2. After having filled out the first post-negotiation questionnaire, all partic-
ipants received additional information about the negotiation on another sheet of paper.
Specifically, participants in the relevant information condition received the follow-
ing information (with differences between the two negotiation difficulty conditions in
parentheses):
You just engaged in a negotiation with a bargaining zone of [10/60] cents. The
seller received a bonus for a selling price above [$3.65/$3.15] per pound and the
buyer received a bonus for a buying price below $3.75 per pound.
Given a bargaining zone of [10/60] cents, the combined bonus for both negotia-
tors was [$500/$3000]. If you had split the bargaining zone equally between the
two of you (i.e., settled at [$3.70/$3.45]), both negotiators would have received
a [$250/$1500] bonus. The higher the bonus you received, the lower the bonus
your counterpart received, and the larger bonus your counterpart received, the
lower was your bonus.
Negotiators were then asked to restate the bonus they earned as well as indicate the
bonus they would have received given an equal split.
Participants in the irrelevant information condition received the following informa-
tion, regardless of negotiation difficulty condition:
You just engaged in a negotiation about a coffee contract. The seller received
a bonus for achieving a high selling price and the buyer received a bonus for
buying at a low price. The bargaining zone was positive, that is, it was possible
to reach an agreement. Negotiations similar to this simulation occur frequently
in the real world.
Negotiators were then asked to restate the bonus they earned.
Next, participants in all conditions then responded to the second negotiation coun-
terpart preference measure. Before doing so they were told that they should feel free
to give the same answers as before or to change them, whatever they liked. At both
times, negotiator counterpart preferences were measured with the following item on a
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Fig. 1 Interaction effect between negotiation difficulty, information, and measurement on negotiation
counterpart preferences (Study 3)
7-point Likert scale (7: strongly agree, 1: strongly disagree): “I would like to negotiate
again with my counterpart in a negotiation like this but for real outcomes”.
4.2 Results and Discussion
I first examined whether scores at the individual level were dependent on which dyad
negotiators were randomly assigned to. The analyses revealed no significant influence
of dyad on counterpart preference in the first measurement (p = 0.86) or the second
measurement (p = 0.35). As suggested in Kashy and Kenny (2000), the data were
thus analyzed at the individual level.
4.2.1 Manipulation Check
To test whether the manipulation of negotiation difficulty was successful, perceptions
of negotiation difficulty were assessed (“I found this negotiation exercise to be dif-
ficult”; on a 7-point Likert scale). As expected, the negotiation was experienced as
significantly more difficult in the difficult negotiation condition (M = 3.46) than in
the easy negotiation condition (M = 3.00), F(1, 147) = 4.48, p < 0.05.
4.2.2 Debiasing Effect of Relevant Information
To test Hypothesis 6, I conducted a mixed-measures ANOVA with negotiation diffi-
culty and information as between-subjects factors and measurement as within-subjects
factor. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between
negotiation difficulty, information, and measurement, F(1, 143) = 4.23, p < 0.05.
A closer look at the form of the interaction showed that the interaction was consistent
with Hypothesis 6 (see Fig.1).
Replicating the results of Study 2 and in further support of Hypothesis 4, negoti-
ation difficulty significantly affected counterpart preferences before additional infor-
mation about the negotiation situation was received (first measurement), F(1, 143) =
6.72, p = 0.01. As expected, before any information was received, negotiators in the
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difficult negotiation condition showed a lower preference to negotiate with their coun-
terpart again (M = 4.82, SD = 1.47) than those in the easy negotiation condition
(M = 5.38, SD = 1.28). Negotiation difficulty continued to affect counterpart prefer-
ences at the second measurement when the information provided before the measure-
ment was irrelevant, F(1, 84) = 2.83, p < 0.05, one-tailed. As expected, counterpart
preferences were lower when the negotiation was difficult (M = 4.9, SD = 1.32)
than when it was easy (M = 5.34, SD = 1.08).
However, when relevant information about the difficulty of the negotiation situation
was given before the second measurement, the difference in counterpart preferences
disappeared, F(1, 60) = 0.14, ns, and negotiators had similarly strong preferences to
negotiate with their counterpart again in both the difficult (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50)
and the easy negotiation condition (M = 5.63, SD = 1.33). Further analyses revealed
that the assimilation of counterpart preferences was the result of ratings improving in
the difficult negotiation condition when relevant information was given. Specifically,
counterpart preferences in the difficult negotiation condition at the second measure-
ment were higher when relevant (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) rather than irrelevant
information (M = 4.9, SD = 1.32) was received prior to measurement, F(1, 72) =
3.27, p < 0.05, one-tailed. No such difference was found in the easy negotiation con-
dition, F(1, 72) = 1.09, ns (relevant information, M = 5.63, SD = 1.33, irrelevant
information, M = 5.34, SD = 1.08). Further, counterpart preferences significantly
improved from the first assessment (M = 4.78, SD = 1.68) to the second assessment
(M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) only when relevant information was received between the
measurements and the negotiation situation was difficult, F(1, 31) = 9.41, p < 0.01.
When the negotiation situation was easy, no significant change occurred between the
first measurement (M = 5.59, SD = 1.27) and the second measurement (M =
5.69, SD = 1.31), F(1, 28) = 0.37, ns. Similarly, when the information provided
was irrelevant, counterpart preferences did not improve. This was the case when the
negotiation situation was difficult (first measurement, M = 4.86, SD = 1.30, second
measurement, M = 4.9, SD = 1.32), F(1, 41) = 0.22, ns, and when the negoti-
ation was easy (first measurement, M = 5.25, SD = 1.28, second measurement,
M = 5.34, SD = 1.08), F(1, 43) = 0.49, ns.
5 General Discussion
Before negotiations can start, negotiators need to decide with whom to negotiate. Such
negotiation counterpart decisions can have a significant impact on negotiation success
(Raiffa 2002; Reb 2007; Tenbrunsel etal. 1999). Unfortunately, little research has
addressed such negotiation counterpart decisions. Three studies examined the influ-
ence of past negotiations on subsequent negotiation counterpart preferences. Study 1
found that the more favorable a past negotiated agreement the stronger the preference
to negotiate with the counterpart again in the future. Moreover, this relation was med-
iated through liking of the counterpart: the better the past outcome, the more liked
was the counterpart; and the higher the liking, the stronger the preference to negotiate
with the counterpart again in the future. Study 2 manipulated how difficult it was to
achieve a favorable outcome from the negotiation and found a significant effect of
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471
this situational factor such that preference to negotiate with the counterpart again was
lower when the negotiation was difficult. Similar to Study 1, this effect was mediated
through liking of the counterpart. Study 2 suggests that negotiators misattribute situ-
ational determinants of negotiation outcomes to the counterpart, thus unduly biasing
negotiation counterpart preferences. Study 3 examined the possibility of debiasing
counterpart preferences by providing relevant information about the negotiation sit-
uation. Replicating the results of Study 2, results showed that negotiation difficulty
negatively affected counterpart preferences before any information was given and also
after irrelevant information was given. However, once negotiators received relevant
information on the negotiation situation, the effect of negotiation difficulty on coun-
terpart preferences disappeared. Thus, Study 3 showed a way in which negotiation
counterpart preferences can be protected from a misattribution bias of situational fac-
tors to personal characteristics of the counterpart. The present research has several
noteworthy implications.
5.1 Past Negotiation Experiences and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
One might expect negotiators to base their counterpart decisions on a forward-look-
ing analysis of the expected utilities of negotiating with their potential counterparts.
However, research on decision making and negotiation suggests that negotiators will
be guided by simple heuristics that use limited information to arrive at a relatively fast
and cognitively less demanding counterpart evaluation (Gilovich etal. 2002; Neale
and Bazerman 1991; Zajonc 1980). Based on this research, I predicted that negoti-
ators’ counterpart preferences would be significantly influenced by past negotiation
experience with the counterpart, as such past experience can serve as a convenient
and easily available cue to evaluate a counterpart. This prediction was confirmed in
several studies.
The results of Study 1 suggest that the more economic gain is derived from a nego-
tiated agreement, the more favorable are preferences to negotiate with the counterpart
again in the future. Study 1 focused on such an “objective” measure of the outcome of
a negotiation partly because it is of high importance in most negotiations and partly
because it is a relatively salient cue that negotiators can easily use to evaluate a coun-
terpart. However, future research should examine the role of other types of negotiation
outcomesonsubsequentcounterpartpreferences.First,thisresearchcouldexaminethe
influence of subjective measures, such as outcome satisfaction. Past research has found
that objective negotiation outcomes and subjective evaluations of these outcomes can
diverge significantly (Galinsky etal. 2002a,b). Thus, it would be interesting to test
whether the results reported here replicate with subjective measures of negotiation
outcomes.
Second, the relation between other aspects of the negotiation experience and coun-
terpart preferences should be examined. Although most negotiation research focuses
on own instrumental or economic outcomes, negotiators also care about other aspects
of a negotiation (Greenhalgh 1987; Novemsky and Schweitzer 2004). For example,
one might expect the quality of, or satisfaction with, the negotiation process to affect
counterpart preferences. In other words, given the same economic value of the agree-
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ment, one might expect counterpart preferences to be higher when the counterpart
used a fair negotiation process rather than an unfair one. Negotiation process variables
that could be examined include whether the other party was polite, fair, cooperative,
and respectful.
Studies 2 and 3 suggest that counterpart preferences may be unduly influenced
by situational determinants of the negotiation experience. In particular, when it was
difficult to reach a favorable outcome from the negotiated agreement due to a nar-
row bargaining zone, preference to negotiate with the other party again in the future
was significantly lower than when it was easy to reach a favorable agreement (cf.
Morris etal. 1999). Study 3 also showed a way to debias counterpart preferences:
when negotiators received relevant—but not when they received irrelevant—informa-
tion, the effect of negotiation difficulty on preferences disappeared.
One can wonder to what extent variables such as process satisfaction are influenced
by situational factors rather than characteristics of the counterpart and to what extent
negotiators are able to accurately distinguish between these two. Just as in the present
studies, negotiators might tend to attribute detrimental situational influences to the
other party. One interesting question is whether beneficial situational influences also
tend to be attributed incorrectly to the counterpart. The results of Study 3 suggest that
it is the negative influence of a difficult situation that carries more weight. This study
found that the debiasing information only improved counterpart preferences in the
difficult negotiation situation condition; preferences in the easy negotiation condition
remained unchanged. Future research could attempt to tease apart more carefully the
influence of positive and negative situational factors on counterpart evaluations.
5.2 Interpersonal Liking and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences
The present studies suggest that liking of another party leads to a stronger preference
to negotiate with that party. In addition, liking seems to play an important role as a
mediating variable through which other, more distal variables influence negotiation
counterpart preferences. This finding is consistent with research that shows liking
to serve as a simple and quick heuristic to form preferences (Zajonc 1980). Future
research could examine more fully the implications of the relation between liking and
negotiation counterpart preferences. In particular, it may be interesting to examine
how liking-based counterpart preference may lead negotiators astray. For example,
research suggests that familiarity increases liking (Zajonc 1968; Brockner and Swap
1976). Thus, one might expect negotiators to prefer to negotiate with familiar others,
such as friends and family. Past research has been inconclusive about whether nego-
tiations with close others lead to superior or inferior outcomes than negotiations with
strangers (Valley etal. 1994). Certainly, there is a danger that the conflict inherent in
negotiations burdens the relationship. Thus, liking may draw individuals to negotiate
with close others even though the negotiation may negatively effect the relationship
between the parties.
Also, consider the implications of the finding that similarity leads to liking (Byrne
1971; Byrne and Griffitt 1973). Because negotiators can reach integrative agreements
by trading off their differences in values, preferences, and expectations, more similar
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473
negotiators are likely to achieve lower outcomes because of a lack of trade off pos-
sibilities (Raiffa 2002). Also, consider that people tend to like physically attractive
individuals more (Berscheid and Walster 1974) and, thus, may prefer to negotiate
with physically attractive counterparts. However, because physically attractive indi-
viduals tend to perform better in social interactions such as negotiations (Hosoda etal.
2003), choosing such a counterpart might actually lead to less favorable outcomes. In
other words, negotiators might actually be better off choosing a physically unattractive
counterpart, even though they are likely to do the opposite.
5.3 Other Influences on Negotiation Counterpart Decisions
The present studies focused on the influence of past negotiations on counterpart pref-
erences, and in particular, the role of economic gain, negotiation difficulty, and liking.
Future research could examine additional variables that might influence negotiation
counterpart decisions. For example, in addition to liking, other variables relating to
the relationship between the two negotiators might play an important role in shaping
preferences. Thus, future research could examine the role of trust, power, and status
in order to be able to paint a more detailed picture of the formation of negotiation
counterpart preferences.
More broadly, future studies could examine variables not related to past negotiation
experiences with the counterpart. Negotiators will often not have first-hand negotia-
tion experience with most of the potential counterparts. How do negotiators select
their counterparts in such situations? One possibility is that they rely on information
provided by the potential counterparts, including information about their resources,
negotiation style, etc. Another possibility is that they use information from other
sources about counterparts’ reputation, status, power, or personality. Yet another pos-
sibility is that they choose the most convenient, easily available counterpart in an
effort to keep transaction costs low. Quite likely, which strategy is chosen will depend
on such factors as the ease of availability of the different pieces of information as
well as their perceived reliability. As these examples illustrate, there are a number of
interesting research questions in search for answers.
5.4 Improving Negotiation Counterpart Decisions
From a more applied perspective, more research should be conducted on ways to
improve counterpart decisions. The results of Study 3 suggest, for example, that the
influence on counterpart preferences of irrelevant situational factors, such as the diffi-
culty of the negotiation situation, can be eliminated by providing relevant information
about the negotiation situation. Of course, in real negotiations such information will
oftennotbeavailable.Clearly,moreresearchisneededonotherwaysto“debias”nego-
tiators from the influence of situational characteristics on counterpart preferences, and
also, more generally, on how to help negotiators make better counterpart decisions.
As one direction, Barry and Oliver (1996) propose that a negative affective state will
lead negotiators to make more strategic, rational counterpart decisions. Perhaps less
emotionally unpleasant, bringing the importance of selecting the right counterpart to
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negotiators’ awareness could be a simple, yet effective, way to improve counterpart
decisions.
5.5 Limitations
Very little research has examined negotiation counterpart decisions. As such one must
be careful not to draw any premature conclusions on the basis of the present stud-
ies. Some of the present results, such as the relation between liking and counterpart
preferences and the effect of negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences, were
found in two studies, which is reassuring to some extent. However, several limitations
of the present research need to be kept in mind. First, we do not know how well the
present findings generalize to other types of negotiators and negotiations. The present
study participants were relatively inexperienced in negotiating. Would more experi-
enced negotiators be influenced just as much by interpersonal liking, or would their
approach to selecting counterparts be more “strategic” and analytical?
Also, in all three studies negotiators performed simulated, rather than real, negoti-
ations with hypothetical, rather than real outcomes. Negotiators were encouraged to
take the task seriously in order to make the negotiations more engaging. Also, the large
majority of participants used most of the available time for the negotiation, suggesting
they took the task seriously. In addition, the highly controlled environment created in
the laboratory was conducive to the internal validity of the studies. Nevertheless, lab-
oratory studies should be complemented by field research of negotiation counterpart
decisions in the “real world.”
Further, the present studies assessed counterpart preferences towards one party
only, namely, the counterpart of the negotiation just completed. Only in Study 3 did
negotiators expect to negotiate again and believed that their counterpart preferences
would influence with whom they would be paired for the second negotiation. However,
in the present studies negotiators did not actually choose their preferred counterpart
among a set of potential counterparts. While our design was chosen so as to get at the
influence of past negotiations on subsequent counterpart preferences, future research
should also examine choices among a pool of potential counterparts.
Finally, it is important to recognize that negotiators do not always have a choice
with whom to negotiate. Examples include negotiations that take place in ongoing
relationships between employee and supervisor, wife and husband, or partners in a
joint venture. In other cases, the pool of available counterparts will be large, such as
in the case of a car buyer who can choose from among a huge number of other parties.
Sometimes, a counterpart choice may exist even when it is not obvious at first. For
example, a choice of counterpart may be available in negotiations by agents for prin-
cipals (Bazerman etal. 1992). Even though the negotiation counterpart is fixed at the
level of the principal (e.g., the partner in a joint venture), there may nevertheless be
some choice at the level of the agents who perform the actual negotiating. Further, a
counterpart choice may be opened up through a consideration of time frame. The idea
here is that “physically” the same counterpart may negotiate differently at different
times. For example, if employees expect their supervisors’ negotiation behavior to
be different, and more favorable for them, on a Friday than on a Monday, they can
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deliberately decide to negotiate with their “Friday-bosses” and avoid negotiating with
their “Monday-bosses”.
6 Conclusion
Mannix (2003) pointed out the need for new directions to give fresh impetus to the field
of negotiation research. Most negotiation research starts with the negotiators sitting
at the “bargaining table”. Moreover, it is the researchers who typically assign negoti-
ators to their counterparts rather than the negotiators matching up with each other by
themselves. It is perhaps partly due to the restricting influence of this “standard meth-
odology” that past research has largely ignored negotiation counterpart decisions. By
highlighting the role of this neglected aspect of negotiations, I hope that the present
studies contribute to a widening of our fields’ view of the negotiation process and
provide impetus for more research on negotiation counterpart decisions. In addition
to the theoretical contributions, there seems to be substantial practical value of such
research given the importance that is attributed to negotiation preparation in general
(e.g., Lewicki etal. 2003) and negotiation counterpart decisions in particular (Raiffa
2002; Tenbrunsel etal. 1999) for achieving successful negotiations. Research on nego-
tiation counterpart decisions is only at its beginning, but, I believe, holds substantial
promise to improve our understanding of negotiation behavior as well as to help nego-
tiators achieve better outcomes.
Acknowledgements This research was funded in part by the Office of Research, Singapore Management
University (Grant Number 05-C207-SMU-034).
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